ISIS: A History by Fawaz A. Gerges

Author:Fawaz A. Gerges [Gerges, Fawaz A.]
Language: eng
Format: epub, azw3, pdf
ISBN: 9781400880362
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Published: 2016-04-04T05:00:00+00:00

POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN BAGHDADI AND JOULANI: THE RISE OF ISIS

Al-Nusra’s surge, coupled with Joulani’s rise to stardom, threatened the ambitions of Baghdadi and his inner circle, who swiftly acted to assert control over what they perceived as their men and their project in Syria. In an audio recording in April 2013, Baghdadi publicly divulged the connection between the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Nusra, stating that al-Nusra was an extension of ISI and that al-Nusra’s strategic goal was to establish an Islamic state in Syria. Unilaterally dissolving the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Nusra, Baghdadi announced a merger, a new entity, called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2013.62 Baghdadi’s declaration threatened not only Joulani’s leadership of al-Nusra but also other armed Islamist groups in Syria. In his proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Baghdadi had warned that Islamist groups who refused to swear allegiance to ISIS would be considered enemies. Less than twenty-four hours after Baghdadi’s ultimatum, Joulani fired the first shot in an internal jihadist civil war that is still raging today by strategically involving AQC as a way of circumventing Baghdadi’s order.63

In a response to his Iraqi nemesis’s statement, Joulani insisted he had only learnt about the merger announcement through the media, before adding, “If the attributed speech is true, then we weren’t consulted or issued requests.”64 Trying to reassure his local Syrian allies, Joulani noted that his alliance with Al Qaeda would not shift the group’s policies or priorities, which remained focused on toppling the Assad regime. While this claim rings true in the short term, it is untenable in the long term. For instance, in his interview with Al Jazeera in May 2015, Joulani was asked how al-Nusra might react if the United States and its Western allies continued to target his group in Syria, to which he answered, “The guidelines we received until now were to refrain from attacking the West and America from Syria. And we abide by the guidelines of Dr. Ayman [al-Zawahiri] … but if this situation continues like this I believe that there will be outcomes which will not be in the benefit of the West and not in the benefit of America.”65

Joulani’s response left out two important points, the absence of which shed further light on the relationship between al-Nusra and AQC on the one hand and al-Nusra and Baghdadi’s ISI on the other. As mentioned before, from the beginning al-Nusra was conceived as a jihadist outfit by Baghdadi and his inner circle, although its identity was kept secret until Baghdadi exposed the link in April 2013. Zawahiri revealed that Baghdadi’s declaration of ISIS “was a clear violation of the orders of the Al-Qaeda leadership … to not announce an official presence in Syria.” He also called Baghdadi’s decision catastrophic because it triggered fitna (sedition) within the jihadist camps: “The announcement caused a sharp split within the same group which led to infighting … and a stream of blood.”66 Therefore, Joulani’s pledge

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